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【Beihang Economics and Business Academic Forum 】Collective Punishment and Commitmentin Public Good Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Publish Date: 2017/03/08 11:27:15    Hits:

Title:Collective Punishment and Commitmentin Public Good Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Lecturer:Prof.Simon Weidenholzer,University of Essex

Time:3.9 16:00—17:30

Location:A928 Invited by Zhiwei Cui

AbstractWe experimentally explore the role of punishment in sustaining cooperation in public goods games when there is uncertainty about the contributions of individuals. In particular, we consider sanctioning mechanisms that allow agents to commit to punishment and punishment mechanisms were all group members will be collectively punished. While the ability to commit results in higher contribution levels for standard and collective punishment only sanctioning mechanisms that are collective increase social welfare.