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Prof.Meng Xu's Lecture Notice

Publish Date: 2018/04/07 11:04:17    Hits:

Title:How to Restrain Participants Opt out in Shared Parking Management? --A Modelling Approach

Presenter: Prof. Meng Xu

Time:2018.4.8,9:00-10:30 am

Location:A716

Invited by: Prof.Tianliang Liu

Abstract:

To restrain the potential opting out of participants (parking slot demanders and slot suppliers) in a given parking management platform, a fairness method permitting recurrent auctions is proposed from a double-side perspective, i.e., we present a fair recurrent double auction mechanism (FRDAM) to approach the shared parking management problem. The mechanism is based on the participants’ priority attributes, which are calculated with respect to historic auction records provided by the parking platform. Participants’ fairness bids are then generated combining with their priority attributes and their submitted bids (parking time and bid price) with the support of a novel evaluation function, which integrates fairness bids with priority attributes, parking time and bid price into a single output value). The parking slot allocation rule and transaction payment rule are further designed to dealing with the issues includes winner determination and price setting, respectively. Numerical examples show advantages of the proposed FRDAM, i.e., comparing with the utilitarian mechanism (UM) for the shared parking management problem, where priority attributes and evaluation function are not considered, the proposed FRDAM has the potential to persuade participants to remain in the market whilst it improves the market’s retention rate, the parking slot’s utilization rate and the participants’ utilities.