Title: Authority and Communication under the Shadow of Future Centralization
Speaker: Xundong YIN
Time:6.14 12:15-14:00
Location:A949。
Abstract：
This paper re-investigates the desirability of delegation under the shadow of future centralization. We consider a two-period model where in the first period, the principal chooses between delegation and no delegation, while the second period decision is made by the principal based on the information acquired in the first period. Different from the classical finding in Dessein (2002) which claims that delegation always dominates no delegation for all parameter values whenever communication is informative, we find that adding the second-period centralized decision always weakens the dominance of delegation over no delegation, and we can always find parameter values for which communication is informative while no delegation strictly dominates fully separating delegation.
Introduction：
Dr. Yin is an Associate Professor in China Institute of Public Finance and Policy of Central University of Finance and Economics. His research focuses on contract theory, industrial organization and corporate finance.
