Title：Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach
Presenter:Jin Xu
Time：11.30 12:00-14:00
Location：A1028
Abstract：
We study a contest game among players fighting in a nexus of conflicts. We show that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria is nonempty and convex, and provide equivalent characterizations using techniques from Variational Inequality (VI). We illustrate that strong monotonicity of cost functions always implies uniqueness of equilibrium regardless of the structure of conflict. Moreover, we conduct extensive comparative statics analysis with respect to the parameters of the model on equilibrium efforts and payoffs, and discuss several applications in terms of prize allocation and contest design.
Introduction：
We study Dr. Jin Xu is Associate Professor of Operations Research at the School of Mathematics, Shandong University. His research interest focuses on Strategic interactions in networks and their implications on firms' operational decision making.
